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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET TERESA LAMBERTH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. 14383
-vSCOTT M. LAMBERTH,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for support under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
From an order of support for the plaintiff-respondent,
the defendant-appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the order of
support.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this appeal the defendant-appellant makes many
assertions of fact which are not supportable in the record
on appeal, and therefore, should be ignored as totally self-

serving and spurious.

The facts as shown in the record

on appeal are as follows:
The plaintiff-respondent is the former spouse of
the defendant-appellant the parties having been married on
or about December 13, 194 9 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and
having been divorced in the State of Texas on or about
August 16, 1973 (R.4, 25-29).

Prior to their divorce, the

parties, while residents of the State of Virginia, entered
into a property settlement agreement which provided, inter
alia, as follows:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto wish to settle
all matters relating to support and maintenance
of WIFE, division of their property, and other
related matters,
NOW, THEREFORE, in adjustment and compromise of
all property rights and other related matters, and
in adjustment and compromise of all matters relating
to maintenance, custody, and support and personal
relationship, and in consideration of the mutual
promises and covenants hereinafter set forth, the
parties hereto do here mutually covenant and agree,
grant and convey as follows:
1. HUSBAND agrees to pay to WIFE during his
lifetime, so long as the WIFE shall live and remain
unremarried (but such obligation shall cease upon the
occurrence of the first of any such events) the sum
of Four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800.00) per
annum payable in monthly installments of Four hundred
dollars ($400.00) per month; provided, however, that
such obligation of the HUSBAND shall be reduced by
an amount equal to 20 per cent of the gross income
of the wife per annum from salary, wages and bonuses
from employment by the WIFE, if any. Such reduction
shall be effected coincident with employment of the
WIFE and further effected coincident with each increase
in salary, wages, or bonuses received by the WIFE,

which shall be pro-rated upon the basis of the
applicable year, month, part of a year or part
of a month. The WIFE shall promptly notify the
HUSBAND of each employment and of each adjustment
in salary, wages, or bonuses. On or before
March 15 of each year, the WIFE shall deliver to
the HUSBAND a statement which reflects the actual
amount of gross salary, wages, and bonuses from
employment during the prior calendar year and
promptly thereafter the parties shall adjust any
overpayment or underpayment made during the prior
calendar year by the HUSBAND to the WIFE. (R. 26-27).
The foregoing"property settlement agreement" was
incorporated into the Texas divorce decree and was ordered to
be made part of that judgment in accordance with the terms
thereof. (R. 25-28).
The plaintiff-respondent filed her petition for
support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act in the Superior Court of the State of California for %
the County of San Diego on January 20, 1975. (R. 4-8). The

.

matter was thereupon referred to the District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah, for enforcement. (R. 8-10).

An order

to show cause why the defendant-appellant should not be
ordered and required to pay a reasonable amount per month for
the support and maintenance of his former spouse was served
upon the defendant (R. 11-13) and he filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted (R. 29). The motion to dismiss was denied on
October 20, 1975 (R. 31), following which the defendant-appellant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff-respondent the sum of $150.00

per month for continuing support (R. 33-34).

The defendant-

appellant appeals from this order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDER OF SUPPORT OF THE LOWER COURT IS BASED
UPON A PRE-DIVORCE "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT"
CREATING A SUPPORT OBLIGATION COGNIZABLE UNDER
THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT.
The "duty of support" contemplated in the Uniform
Reciprocal of Support Act "includes any duty of support
imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order, decree
or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation,
separate maintenance or otherwise."

Section 77-61a-2 (f)

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, underscoring supplied.
Characterization of the agreement as a "property settlement
agreement" has no effect on its content.

It was clearly

intended by the parties to provide for the support and
maintenance of plaintiff-respondent.

Apart from the expressed

intent to provide for "support and maintenance", it was to
endure for the life or until remarriage of plaintiff-respondent
l

and vary in sums due, according to the financial circumstances
of the parties.

As noted by the Supreme Court of Utah in

another case involving a "property settlement agreement",
i

this agreement created an obligation "in the nature of alimony"
and was really intended to supply "support and maintenance"

to plaintiff-respondent.

Lyon vs. Lyon, 115 U. 466,

296 P.2d 148, 150. There being no challenge to the
validity of such an agreement, the duty of defendantappellant to render support to plaintiff-respondent
according to its terms is plainly "imposed or imposable
by law" and thus cognizable under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.

POINT II
THE SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE OF THE PARTIES DID
NOT TERMINATE APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION TO
THE RESPONDENT UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
As a general rule, provisions for spousal support
in a separation agreement are not abrogated by a subsequent
divorce, absent more.

24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation

§917; 42 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, §602; Campbell vs.
Campbell, (Md. C.A. 1938) 198 A. 414, 116 A.L.R. 939, 947;
Gunter vs. Gunter (Mass. App. 1975)

334 A.2d 437. In Texas,

where the instant divorce was obtained, notwithstanding an
anti-alimony public policy, the practice of incorporating
"property settlement" agreements with built-in support provisions
in divorce decrees has been countenanced.

Shortly before the

instant divorce was adjudged, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals

ruled that an agreement remarkably similar to that here
in issue which had been incorporated into a Texas decree
of divorce was enforceable in an action at law, though
perhaps not with aid of the contempt power because of
Texas public policy.

Miller vs. Miller, (C. A. Tex. 1971)

463 S.W. 2d 477.
Being mindful that plaintiff here is not seeking
to enforce a Texas judgment but rather an obligation for
support arising from the former relationship of the parties
and a bona fide agreement between them, the law of Texas
and the force of the Texas divorce decree are not decisive,
if material at all.

In this connection it should be noted

that under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act the law
of the State of residence of the obligor, i.e., Utah in this
case, is applicable.
1953, as amended.

Section 77-61a-7 Utah Code Annotated

But, assuming arguendo that the law of

Texas is material and was as represented by defendant,
plaintiff, would nonetheless be entitled to be heard on her
petition for support since, by his actions, defendant is
estopped from denying the obligations undertaken in his
"property settlement" agreement.

Watton vs. Watton, Calif.

C. A. 1946) 173 P.2d 867. Applying familiar rules of equity
to a situation similar to the present case in which a foreign
decree of divorce was claimed to cut off a former wifefs right
to support under a separation agreement, the California

Court of Appeals observed at Page 86 9 of 173 P.2d
Reporter:
"Defendant's agreement and the arrangement
to have the terms of it carried into the decree
no doubt furnished inducement to plaintiff to
allow defendant to procure a divorce by default.
Having obtained the decree, it would be most
unfair and a legal fraud upon the plaintiff for
defendant to retain the advantage of the decree
and to escape his obligation by denying the
jurisdiction of the court to award plaintiff
support."
POINT III
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT REQUIRES THIS STATE
TO RECOGNIZE THE DIVORCE DECREE GRANTED TO
THE PARTIES IN TEXAS.
The defendant-appellant's only argument on appeal
is that this court should declare a portion of the Texas
divorce decree which he himself obtained as invalid upon
the grounds that full faith and credit requires the property
settlement agreement of the parties to be stricken therefrom
under Texas law as enunciated in other cases.

He misconceives

the constitutional obligation of this court.

The Utah Supreme

Court is not enpowered to sit as an appellate court to
overturn the judgment of a Texas District Court long after
the defendant-appellant's right to appeal that judgment in
the proper Texas forum has expired.
Article 4, §1 of the United States Constitution
provides that:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of every other state."

Even if this action were dependent upon the divorce decree
of the Texas District Court, which it is not as hereinabove
pointed out under Points I and II, the only "judicial
proceedings" to which the Utah courts must extend full faith
and credit in the instant case are those culminating in the
divorce judgment of the District Court of San Patricio
County, Texas incorporating the property settlement agreement
between the parties hereto.

Thus full faith and credit

would require this court to sustain the judgment of the
Texas District Court—not to overrule it.

This case is

not unlike Intermountain Association of Credit Men vs.
Watterson, 19 U. 2d 212, 429 P. 2d 818 (1967), in which
this court held as follows: ' .'\,\'

y:/''^\.

.;^/'}..'//[

:

h

"Idaho was the forum chosen by the assignors.
Their assignee cannot change that forum, or the
subject matter in order to seek a new forum and
a different theory of action to serve its own
ends.
The assignee sued on an Idaho judgment. By
conceding its invalidity, after it asserted its
validity, it cannot now say I didn't mean what
I said. After conceding the invalidity of the
Idaho judgment, which it cannot do unless the
Idaho courts agree, this court will recognize the
Idaho judgment, and in our opinion, Intermountain
best should go back to Idaho and pursue its remedies
there.
I
...We prefer to respect the judgment of our sister
state and not the stipulations of counsel who, having
sought her jurisdiction, conveniently now are
willing to attest to her illegitimacy."
As stated in the foregoing case, this court should
now respect the judgment of our sister state, Texas, and not

'

the argument of a subsequently dissatisified litigant
who, having sought her jurisdiction, is now conveniently
willing to attest to her illegitimacy.

CONCLUSION
The order of support of the lower court is valid
and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted:

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General for the State of
Utah

JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Attorney General for
the State of Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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